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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The common law long held that contract provisions controlling the resolu-
tion of future disputes between the parties were revocable until such a dispute 
was actually resolved by the forum designated in the agreement.  In the context 
in which it evolved, this was a sound rule.  It would today be a sound rule that 
such provisions are revocable when formed in contracts of adhesion, at least 
until a dispute to which they purport to apply has been submitted in writing to 
the specified forum or procedure. 
In 1746, an English judge explained the ancient doctrine of revocability as 
based on the petty jealousy of courts fearing ouster of their jurisdiction.1  That 
erroneous explanation was perpetuated as a reason for abrogating the common 
law rule when, in the late nineteenth century, it discommoded merchants 
making deals for goods to be shipped by rail in interstate commerce.2  The rule 
was abrogated by the Federal Arbitration Act of 19253 (FAA), whose authors 
explained the rule as a feature of the federal common law governing contract 
disputes brought as diversity cases.  Since that time, the Supreme Court has 
vastly expanded the applicability of arbitration legislation,4 making it applicable 
to many types of contracts to which the application of the revocability doctrine 
would make better sense.  Congress has recently revived the doctrine in its leg-
islation shielding automobile dealers from the misapplication of federal law.5  It 
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 1. Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B. 1746). 
 2. E.g., Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942) 
(Jerome Frank, J.), quoted in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
638 (1985). 
 3. Pub. L. No. 401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000)). 
 4. See generally Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. 
REV. 331 (providing an overview of the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence on the issue). 
 5. Act of November 2, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, § 11,028 (to be codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1226) (prohibiting enforcement of predispute mandatory arbitration agreements between 
automobile manufacturers, importers, and distributors and automobile retailers).  
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is the purpose of this Article to correct the misunderstanding of the policies 
served by the common law rule and to suggest the rule’s revival for application 
to many of the contracts to which the Supreme Court has expanded the applica-
tion of the FAA. 
II 
REVOCABILITY IN THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW TRADITION 
In medieval England, arbitration was used primarily by guilds of traveling 
craftsmen and merchants as a means of resolving commercial disputes quickly, 
before the parties departed the communities in which their disputes arose and 
without the travail of a trial before a royal judge.6  In that context, the compul-
sion to comply with an arbitration agreement or award stemmed largely from 
the social interdependence of the merchants and resulting communitarian 
norms.  These, it appears, were sufficient to enforce most arbitration agree-
ments.  Enforcement by the King’s judges loomed only as a remote threat.  In 
fact, medieval English courts generally did not enforce arbitration agreements.  
They were deemed to be private arrangements for which there was no enforce-
ment authority other than the personal authority of the parties to the agree-
ment.7 
Vynior’s Case8 in 1609 was the first major expression of the doctrine of revo-
cability.  At the time, the common law of contracts was in its infancy.9  It had 
become a common practice to secure performance of any agreement by putting 
the obligor under bond.  If the obligor failed to perform, the other party had a 
suit on the bond, which might be sufficiently large to protect him.  Robert 
Vynior brought an action against William Wilde on a bond for a hundred 
pounds, demanding twenty pounds’ damages as well as the penal sum of the 
bond.  Vynior’s complaint alleged that the bond had been given by Wilde to 
insure his compliance with an arbitration agreement covering disputes between 
the two, but that Wilde had revoked Vynior’s authority to submit the dispute to 
arbitration in violation of their agreement to “stand to and abide the award.”  
To this, Wilde demurred.  The court ruled that Vynior could recover on both 
his bond and his alleged damages.  For this decision, Lord Coke set forth three 
reasons, one of which was that 
 
 6. Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 599 (1997); see William M. Howard, The Evolution of Contractually Man-
dated Arbitration, 48 ARB. J. 27 (1993). 
 7. Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 598 (1927). 
 8. 77 Eng. Rep. 597 (K.B. 1609).  Revocation had been upheld in Y.B. 8 Edw. 4, fol. 9b, 10a, 
Mich., pl. 9 (1468); Y.B. 5 Edw. 4, fol. 3b, Trin., pl. 2 (1465); Y.B. 28 Hen. 4, fol. 6, Pasch, pl. 4 (1449); 
Y.B. 21 Hen. 4, fol. 30a, Hil., pl. 14 (1442). 
 9. Sayre, supra note 7, at 603; see 14 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
189 (A.L. Goodhart & H.G. Hanbury eds., 1964); FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY, ALSO 
THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 258 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1929); 1 A.W. 
BRIAN SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF 
ASSUMPSIT 9-135 (1987). 
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[a]lthough William Wilde, the defendant, was bound in a bond to stand to, abide, 
observe, etc., the rule, etc., of arbitration, etc., yet he might countermand it, for one 
cannot by his act make such authority, power, or warrant not countermandable which 
is by the law or of its own nature countermandable.10 
Lord Coke explained that when there was a suit on a bond given for a submis-
sion to arbitration, the submission itself was revocable, but such revocation 
came at the price of the forfeiture of the bond.11  While a party had the power to 
revoke a submission, he was still held liable on his bond. 
Unfortunately, common law judges seldom articulated the policy reasons 
underlying the rules they applied, and so Lord Coke did not explain the rea-
soning behind his revocability doctrine.  Paul Sayre discussed the suggestion 
that Vynior may have rested on the idea of agency.12  Lord Coke, however, did 
not employ the word “agency” in his report of his own opinion, nor does the 
word appear in Brownlow and Goldesborough’s reports of the case.13  Further-
more, the concept of agency had not been developed at the time the doctrine of 
revocability emerged.14  In its modern form, agency “indicate[s] the relation 
which exists when one person is employed to act for another.”15  It is “a consen-
sual relationship in which one (the agent) holds in trust for and subject to the 
control of another (the principal) a power to affect certain legal relations of that 
other.”16  Once parties submit to arbitration, the “agent” (that is, the arbitrator), 
to whom authority is granted, is not under an obligation to further the interests 
of the “principal.”  As such, Professor Sayre rightly concluded that agency law 
does not explain the historic application of the revocability doctrine to arbitra-
tion.17 
Nor can the historic revocability of arbitration agreements be explained by 
the theory that revocability is derived from the common law concept of dele-
gated powers.  Because a traditional agreement to arbitrate was purely a private 
arrangement, arbitrators had to get their power to act from the parties before 
them.  On this theory, that power must be revocable at the election of either 
party to the dispute, as are other delegated powers.18  But this theory does not 
 
 10. Vynior’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 598-99. 
 11. See Sayre, supra note 7, at 601-02. 
 12. Id. at 599. 
   13. 1 BROWNLOW & GOLDESBOROUGH 64 (3d ed. 1675); 2 BROWNLOW & GOLDESBOROUGH 
290 (3d. ed. 1675).  
 14. Sayre, supra note 7, at 599-600. 
 15. 1 FLOYD MECHEM, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 25 (2d ed. 1914). 
 16. Warren A. Seavey, The Rationale of Agency, 29 YALE L.J. 859, 868 (1920). 
 17. See Sayre, supra note 7, 599-600. 
 18. Taylor v. Burns, 203 U.S. 120 (1906); Hunt v. Rouismanier, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 174 (1823); 
Cronin v. Am. Sec. Co., 50 So. 915 (Ala. 1909); Chambers v. Seay, 73 Ala. 372 (1882); Hynson v. 
Noland, 14 Ark. 710 (1854); Brown v. Pforr, 38 Cal. 550 (1869); Barr v. Schroeder, 32 Cal. 609 (1867); 
Posten v. Rassette, 5 Cal. 467 (1855); Mitchel v. Gray, 97 P. 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 1908); Briggs v. Cham-
berlain, 107 P. 1082 (Colo. 1910); Lowell v. Hessey, 105 P. 870 (Colo. 1909); Darrow v. St. George, 8 
Colo. 592 (1855); Linder v. Adams & Co., 22 S.E. 687 (Ga. 1895); Davis v. Fidelity Fire Ins. Co., 70 N.E. 
359 (Ill. 1904); Bonney v. Smith, 17 Ill. 531 (1856); Shiff v. Lesseps, 22 La. Ann. 185 (1870); Attrill v. 
Patterson, 58 Md. 226 (1882); Creager v. Link, 7 Md. 259 (1854); Smith v. Kimball, 79 N.E. 800 (Mass. 
1907); Cadigan v. Crabtree, 70 N.E. 1033 (Mass. 1904); Loving Hesperian Co. v. Cattle Co., 75 S.W. 
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explain why the power of the arbitrator could not be an exception to the rule, 
and therefore irrevocable. 
We perceive that the purpose underlying Lord Coke’s revocability doctrine 
was that the rule served to insure the disinterest of arbitrators.  The power that 
arbitrators were granted made them unaccountable to anyone or any entity for 
their fidelity to the terms of the contract or the controlling law.  In view of the 
private source of their power, they had no official obligation to act impartially, 
in accordance with the law, or even in accordance with the contract.  The only 
substantive constraint on an arbitrator’s license resided in the ability of either 
party to revoke his authority.  This assured that the arbitrator knew at the 
moment of undertaking his duty that he was acting on the trust of both parties. 
There was an urgent need for such a policy in the seventeenth century.  
Arbitration then generally took place in a setting engaging the interests of a 
whole community of merchants.  Merchants and craftsmen used arbitration 
because they carried on their trades in a community of their fellows.19  Arbitra-
tion proceedings were conducted by fellow merchants acting in the role of arbi-
trator, and the cases were “viewed in the light of practical expediency and 
decided in [accord with] the ethical or economic norms of some particular 
group.”20  Because the arbitrators were sometimes buyers and sometimes sellers, 
there was a high level of mutual trust in the disinterest of the members selected 
as arbitrators, which was expressed and reinforced by the continued willingness 
to submit to their decision.  However, because this community was so tight, 
there was also reason to believe that decisions would be made for reasons 
having nothing to do with the merits of the dispute at hand.  An entire 
community might turn against a particular disputant, opening the door for the 
arbitrator to serve as the administrator of mob justice rather than act in the role 
of a fair and impartial adjudicator.  Thus, the doctrine of revocability provided 
the merchant who felt outcast by his community with some element of protec-
tion by allowing him to seek the protections of law in the King’s court.  It also 
served the community by freeing the arbitrator from the stigma of mistrust that 
would have been present if the beleaguered member of the community had no 
choice but to submit to the collective will. 
Despite these compelling considerations, an eighteenth century English 
judge attributed the doctrine of revocability to jurisdiction envy.21  Although the 
court uttering it offered no grounds and no authority for that interpretation, 
once asserted, it continued to be repeated by others.  In 1856, in Scott v. Avery,22 
 
1095 (Mo. 1903); Miller v. Wehrman, 115 N.W. 1078 (Neb. 1908); Hartshorne v. Thomas, 10 A. 843 
(N.J. Eq. 1887); Hutchins v. Hebbard, 34 N.Y. 24 (1865); Gardner v. Pierce, 116 N.Y.S. 155 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1909). 
 19. William C. Jones, An Inquiry into the History of the Adjudication of Mercantile Disputes in 
Great Britain and the United States, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 455 (1958). 
 20. Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 132, 
132 (1934). 
 21. Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B. 1746). 
 22. 10 Eng. Rep. 1121 (H.L. 1856). 
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Lord Campbell repeated the view that the doctrine of hostility to arbitration at 
common law “probably originated in the contests of the different courts in 
ancient times for extent of jurisdiction, all of them being opposed to anything 
that would deprive one of them of jurisdiction.”23  This assertion was again 
made without any evidence in its support, but judges and commentators appear 
to have subsequently taken Lord Campbell at his word.  Scott v. Avery came to 
be known as the great case on revocability, and Campbell’s doctrine of “judicial 
jealousy” became one of the most frequently cited reasons for revocability.  In 
fact, eighteenth century common law courts showed no unwillingness to enforce 
awards or agreements to arbitrate existing disputes, as would seem likely to 
follow from jurisdiction envy.24 
Vynior’s Case, though decided almost 250 years earlier, itself illustrates a 
willingness to enforce an arbitration agreement under properly confined cir-
cumstances.  While the court acknowledged the general right to revoke, it per-
mitted a full recovery on the bond and the alleged damages, the combined sum 
of which was probably much in excess of what could reasonably have been 
recovered on the cause of action itself.  The court thus did all that was reasona-
bly necessary to sustain arbitration.  This typified an absence of judicial hostility 
to the practice of arbitration.  As Professor Sayre argued, “[i]f the courts had 
been jealous of their jurisdiction or had wished to secure business for them-
selves to the exclusion of arbitration, they might well have ruled that a bond 
given to secure a submission to arbitration was against public policy, and 
void.”25 
III 
REVOCABILITY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES 
Similarly, the belief that the doctrine of revocability was supported in the 
United States during the nineteenth century only because of the jurisdictional 
jealousy of U.S. courts seems to be unjustified.  To the contrary, U.S. courts 
have from the beginning embraced arbitration when freely chosen by the par-
ties.26  Arbitration awards were consistently enforced in federal and in most 
state courts, subject only to the defense of fraud, there being no review on the 
merits.27  In addition, U.S. courts have always enforced agreements to resolve an 
existing dispute by arbitration.28 
 
 23. Id. at 1138. 
 24. See Halfhide v. Fenning, 29 Eng. Rep. 187 (Ch. 1788); Wellington v. Mackintosh, 26 Eng. Rep. 
741 (Ch. 1743). 
 25. See Sayre, supra note 7, at 610. 
 26. IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARIBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, 
INTERNATIONALIZATION 19 (1992). 
 27. See, e.g., Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924); Hamilton v. Liverpool, London 
& Globe Ins., 136 U.S. 242 (1890). 
 28. Parties can agree in court to arbitrate an existing dispute and thus secure a rule of court order-
ing the arbitration.  Courts would enforce such a rule against a subsequently revoking party.  See 
MACNEIL, supra note 26, at 21. 
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Nevertheless, the principle of revocability was widely accepted by nine-
teenth century U.S. courts, and it is perhaps still the law in some states.29  In 
1874, the Supreme Court explained in Home Insurance Co. v. Morse: 
In a civil case [a man] may submit his particular suit by his own consent to an arbitra-
tion, or to the decision of a single judge.  So he may omit to exercise his right to 
remove his suit to a Federal tribunal, as often as he thinks fit . . . .  He cannot, how-
ever, bind himself in advance by an agreement, which may be specifically enforced, 
thus to forfeit his rights at all times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be 
presented.30 
The same principle had been expressed earlier by Justice Story in Tobey v. 
County of Bristol:  
When the law has declared, that an agreement for an arbitration is, in its very nature, 
revocable, and cannot be made irrevocable by any agreement of the parties, courts of 
equity are bound to respect this interposition, and are not at liberty to decree that to 
be positive and absolute in its obligation, which the law declares to be conditional and 
countermandable.31 
Morse and Tobey are merely illustrative of numerous other nineteenth cen-
tury court decisions affirming the doctrine of revocability.32  It seems that there 
was a perception, at least among some U.S. courts, that “the existence of genu-
ine mutual assent was suspect” in a predispute arbitration agreement and that 
“a dispute resolution clause could be a trap for the unwary” and uninformed.  
As one court put it, “[b]y first making the contract and then declaring who 
should construe it, the strong could oppress the weak, and in effect so nullify 
the law as to secure the enforcement of contracts usurious, illegal, immoral, or 
contrary to public policy.”33  As such, the best way to assure true assent to arbi-
tration and the integrity of the arbitral process was to afford a party who has 
agreed to arbitrate a future dispute an opportunity to withdraw assent when a 
dispute has actually arisen and an informed decision is possible. 
 
 29. MACNEIL, supra note 26, at 20; WESLEY A. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND 
AWARDS § 15, at 45 (1930); Carrington & Haagen, supra note 4, at 339. 
 30. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874). 
 31. 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065). 
 32. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Manhattan Ins. Co., 56 Me. 417, 421 (1869); Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins.  Co., 
76 Mass. (6 Gray) 174 (1856); Cobb v. New England Mut. Marine Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 192 
(1856); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 670 (emphasizing that 
the doctrine of revocability was applicable in courts of equity as well as in courts of law). 
 33. Parsons v. Ambos, 48 S.E. 696 (Ga. 1904); see NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM 
STATE LAWS, 34 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE 60-73 (1924).  Compare Cocalis v. 
Nazlides, 139 N.E. 95 (Ill. 1923), with W.H. Blodgett Co. v. Bebe Co., 214 P. 38 (Cal. 1923). 
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IV 
STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS IN ENGLAND 
The English courts’ underlying purpose in promoting the objectivity of arbi-
trators was confirmed by their reactions to a series of legislative enactments 
between 1698 and 1889 through which Parliament sought to strengthen the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements.  In 1698, a year after passing the 
Statute of Fines and Penalties,34 regulating the use of bonds, Parliament enacted 
England’s first arbitration act.35  The aim of the act was to make the submission 
to arbitration irrevocable by making it a rule or order of a court.  A revoking 
party was to be subject to charges of contempt of court.  However, the act did 
not go far to strengthen the hand of the nonbreaching party, for a submission to 
arbitration was still revocable until an action at law to enforce the agreement 
had been brought and a rule or order of court enforcing it had been obtained.36 
The act did not distinguish between the submission of an existing dispute 
and a future dispute.  Both were assumed to come within the purview of the act.  
It did not give the parties the right to secure witnesses or compel testimony in 
the arbitration proceedings, nor did it provide for court review of questions of 
law.  The act did not have any other provisions designed to secure a fair and 
adequate hearing.  English courts reacted to this enactment by continuing to 
hold the submission of a future dispute revocable whenever it did not come 
strictly within the terms of the act.37 
In 1833, Parliament enacted another statute, extending and reinforcing the 
act of 1689.38  It provided that any arbitration agreement, once made a rule or 
order of court, was not revocable by any party without leave of the court, pro-
vided that the submission agreement was made with the understanding that it 
might be made a rule of court.39  The statute of 1833 was an important step 
toward protecting the rights of the parties who submitted to arbitration: it pro-
vided for compulsory legal process by which the court could compel the atten-
dance of witnesses and the production of evidence at hearings.40  Nevertheless, 
even under the legislation, the courts continued to recognize the doctrine of 
revocability whenever possible. 
The statutory trend toward strengthening the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements continued in 1854.  Section 27 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 
 
 34. 1697, 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 11, § 8 (Eng.).  This statute precluded recovery of the face value of bonds 
when they had become single unless the actual damages justified it.  Under this statute and subsequent 
developments through judicial decisions, it became common practice that the courts would look behind 
the sum stated in the bond.  See Sayre, supra note 7, at 604. 
 35. An Act for Determining Differences by Arbitration, 1698, 9 Will. 3, c. 15 (Eng.). 
 36. See Sayre, supra note 7, at 605. 
 37. Id. at 606. 
 38. An Act for the Further Amendment of the Law, and the Better Advancement of Justice, 1833, 
3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, § 28 (Eng.). 
 39. Id. § 39. 
 40. Id. § 40. 
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enacted that year, provided that either party to an arbitration agreement could 
make the submission irrevocable by applying to the court to make it a rule of 
court, even in cases in which the submission had not been made with the under-
standing that it might be made a rule of court.41  In 1889, another statute was 
enacted; its first two sections read as follows: 
1.  A submission, unless a contrary intention is expressed therein, shall be irrevocable, 
except by leave of the Court or a judge, and shall have the same effect in all respects 
as if it had been made an order of court. 
2.  A submission, unless a contrary intention is expressed therein, shall be deemed to 
include the provisions set forth in the First Schedule of this Act, so far as they are 
applicable to the reference under the submission.42 
This enactment presumed that every arbitration agreement was subject to the 
statute.  The effect was that almost all arbitration agreements in England came 
within the purview of the statute. 
However, it bears emphasis that this act also provided for judicial review of 
questions of law raised in arbitration hearings.43  Since court review meant that 
arbitrators did not have the final say on the issue, the passing of the 1889 act 
had the effect of limiting the authority of arbitrators to final disposition of ques-
tions of fact only and assured disinterested assessment of all decisions on issues 
of law. 
Thus, by 1889, the common law doctrine of revocability had been put aside 
in England, but with increasingly stringent protections for the parties’ rights in 
the arbitration proceedings.  As the enforcement of revocability retreated, the 
statutory requirements of procedure progressed to take revocability’s place in 
safeguarding against improper conduct in arbitration proceedings.  Conse-
quently, the delicate balance between guarantees of disinterest and the enforce-
ability of arbitration agreements was maintained through a change of doctrinal 
guards. 
It also bears note that both Parliament and the royal courts were dealing 
with arbitration in a political context quite different from that of their U.S. 
counterparts.  The royal courts were in business to resolve disputes; they were 
not regarded as enforcers of public law and policy, as U.S. courts, even in the 
nineteenth century, were.44  For example, private enforcement of public law by 
means of contingent-fee lawyers presenting claims to civil juries, with the 
American Rule precluding liability for defendants’ legal expenses, is an institu-
tion unique to the United States and one frequently relied upon as an alterna-
tive to administrative regulation of business.45 
 
 41. Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 125, § 27 (Eng.). 
 42. English Arbitration Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., c. 49, §§ 1, 2 (Eng.). 
 43. Id. § 11. 
 44. E.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1-7 (2000)). 
 45. Paul D. Carrington, The Civil Jury and American Democracy, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 79 
(2003). 
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V 
LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Legislation in the United States followed a course similar to that in England, 
but it did not provide for judicial review of legal decisions made by arbitrators.  
The revocability doctrine conferred its benefits and posed no problem in the 
United States until the construction of railroads led to commerce between 
distant merchants.  After the construction of railroads, local communitarian 
sanctions no longer applied to commercial disputes, and distant merchants mis-
trusted local courts.  As such, trade associations were invented, in part to supply 
disinterested forums for the enforcement of contracts between distant mer-
chants.46  To achieve that aim and to prevent a party from resorting to his own 
hometown forum, arbitration clauses needed to be made irrevocable.  Thus, an 
early New York case conceded that arbitration clauses 
induced by fraud, or overreaching, or entered into unadvisedly through ignorance, 
folly or undue pressure, might well be refused a specific performance, or disregarded 
when set up as a defence to an action.  But when the parties stand upon an equal 
footing, and intelligently and deliberately, in making their executory contracts, pro-
vide for an amicable adjustment of any difference that may arise, either by arbitration 
or otherwise, it is not easy to assign at this day any good reason why the contract 
should not stand, and the parties made to abide by it, and the judgment of the tribunal 
of their choice.47 
By 1920, a widespread effort was afoot to modify arbitration laws in all states to 
secure better enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future commercial dis-
putes.  The movement’s oft-stated purpose was to “make the benefits of arbitra-
tion generally available to the business world,” and it was driven primarily by 
those engaged in interstate trade.48 
There was, however, opposition to the enactment of state statutes aiming to 
assure the arbitrability of future disputes.  As late as 1924, both the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar 
Association took positions firmly in opposition to what was perceived by some 
to be an idiosyncrasy of New York law.49  As an example, Ian Macneil quotes 
one opponent’s statement: 
Under the New York Act you are called upon to agree in advance through a clause 
that is in the contract, most often in small type, that all controversies of any nature, 
kind, or description are to be taken out of the courts and are to be submitted to an 
arbitrator either named then or to be named later.  It is felt by the great majority of 
the [ABA] committee that this is wrong in principle, to call upon men to agree in 
advance to arbitrate any difficulties that might arise, particularly in view of the fact 
that that would be done in most instances without any realization on the part of the 
contracting parties as to what they were really doing.  Of course, we all agree that men 
 
 46. See A.W. Brian Simpson, Contracts for Cotton to Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships Peerless, 11 
CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 321-24 (1989). 
 47. President of Del. & Hudson Canal Co. v. Pa. Coal Co., 50 N.Y. 250, 258 (1872).  Contra Henry 
v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 64 A. 635 (Pa. 1906). 
 48. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 407 (2d Cir. 1959) (citing S. 
REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924)). 
 49. MACNEIL, supra note 26, at 49-51. 
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ought to know what they are doing when they are signing contracts, but we all know 
from . . . practical experience that the fine type of contracts[,] whilst entirely binding, 
is seldom read, and we do feel that is a giving up [of] rights that the American people 
really regard as sacred[,] and they shouldn’t be called upon to do so.50 
Reflecting this opposition, the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1925 did not provide 
for the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future disputes.51 
Although the Act was adopted in only four states, “modern” reformers suc-
ceeded over the next four decades in securing legislation in all but three states 
providing for the enforcement of such arbitration clauses.52  Instrumental in that 
effort was the “modern” Uniform Arbitration Act of 1955,53 which was enacted 
in over thirty states, often with significant modifications, but always with provi-
sions for the specific enforcement of arbitration clauses.  The prevailing view 
was that, as between contracting parties of reasonably equal strength and 
sophistication, there is no substantial public interest to be served by precluding 
parties from so moderating the rights they create by their contracts, and ample 
reason to enforce agreements to arbitrate claims asserting such rights.  But as 
recently as 1991, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that Nebraska’s 
“modern” legislation was in violation of the Nebraska constitutional provision 
assuring that “all courts shall be open, and every person, for any injury done 
him in his goods, person, or reputation shall have a remedy by due course of 
law, and justice administered without denial or delay.”54 
It was in the context of this prolonged debate over the reform of state law 
that Congress was in 1925 importuned to act.  The “modern” law, particularly 
that of New York, had been disregarded in federal admiralty and diversity 
cases.  A 1915 opinion of Judge Hough had proclaimed that federal courts were 
powerless to compel arbitration because it was too well settled as a matter of 
federal equity that an arbitration agreement could not be specifically enforced.55  
The damages remedy for breach being ineffective, a merchant seeking to evade 
an arbitration agreement could find refuge through the federal admiralty or 
diversity jurisdictions.  Congress was asked to eliminate this refuge from state 
law. 
Given the broad similarities in the development of arbitration legislation in 
England and the United States, one difference warrants emphasis.  Unlike their 
English counterparts, Congress did not make arbitrators accountable for their 
fidelity to law.  As Justice Hugo Black observed, arbitrators in the U.S. may be 
 
 50. Id. at 51. 
 51. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 1 (1925). 
 52. MACNEIL, supra note 26, at 55-57. 
 53. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (1955), 7 U.L.A. 1 (1996); Maynard Pirsig, The New Uniform Arbi-
tration Act, 11 BUS. L. 44, 44-45 (1956).  For an account of the current state legislation, see George K. 
Walker, Trends in State Legislation Governing International Arbitrations, 17 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 419 (1992). 
 54. Nebraska v. Neb. Ass’n of Pub. Employees, 477 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Neb. 1991).  But see Dowd v. 
First Omaha Sec. Corp., 495 N.W.2d 36 (Neb. 1993) (holding Nebraska law preempted). 
 55. United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 
1915). 
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“wholly unqualified to decide legal issues.”56  And even if qualified, the arbitra-
tor is under no duty to resolve a dispute in compliance with the parties’ legal 
rights.  A Latin phrase sometimes employed to describe the spirit of much 
United States commercial arbitration is ex aequo et bono—a resolution is 
sought that is equitable, minimizes harm to either party, and enables potential 
adversaries to maintain a valuable commercial relationship.  It is said of the 
U.S. commercial arbitrator that he “may do justice as he sees it, applying his 
own sense of the law and equity to the facts as he finds them to be and making 
an award reflecting the spirit rather than the letter of the agreement.”57  And 
although it is also sometimes said that an award may be set aside if the arbitra-
tor “manifestly disregards the law,” this standard is almost never found to 
apply.58 
The hyperinflation of the FAA by the Supreme Court has been addressed 
by the senior author of this Article elsewhere.59  It will not be reconsidered here 
except to remind the reader of the resulting epidemic of arbitration clauses in 
contracts of adhesion having the secondary effect of stripping consumers, 
employees, patients, tenants, shippers, and diverse other individuals not only of 
their substantive entitlements under their contracts, but also of their potential 
status as private attorneys general enforcing public law in the manner contem-
plated by many federal and even state statutes.60  Those who approve of the 
policy consequences of what the Court has done are generally those who have 
read Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations61 and suppose that economic benefits 
acquired in this way will somehow trickle down to the consumers, workers, pas-
sengers, and others whose legal rights are diminished.62  Freedom of contract, in 
this view, is one of the Four Freedoms for which global war has been fought, or 
is at least one implied in the Bill of Rights. 
 
 56. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 57. Silverman v. Benmor Coats, Inc., 461 N.E.2d 1261, 1266 (N.Y. 1984). 
 58. A rare example is Pennsylvania Power Co. v. Local Union No. 272, 276 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2001), 
cert. denied, 536 U.S. 959 (2002). 
 59. See Carrington & Haagen, supra note 4.  See generally Paul D. Carrington, The Dark Side of 
Contract Law, 36 TRIAL 73 (2000); Paul D. Carrington, Regulating Dispute Resolution Provisions in 
Adhesion Contracts, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 225 (1998); Paul D. Carrington, Self-Deregulation, The 
“National Policy” of the Supreme Court, 3 NEV. L.J. 259 (Winter 2002/2003); Paul D. Carrington, 
Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 361 (2003); Paul D. Carrington & Paul Y. Castle, 
Unconscionable Predispute Arbitration Provisions in Construction Contracts, MOLDS, Oct. 2002, at 51. 
 60. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); see, e.g., Dowd v. First Omaha Sec. Corp., 495 
N.W.2d 36 (Neb. 1993). 
 61. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE  NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
(Kathryn Sutherland ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (1776).  
 62. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
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VI 
THE REVIVAL OF THE REVOCABILITY PRINCIPLE 
At least two problems with the fundamentalist economic justification of 
arbitration clauses in standard-form contracts suggest the wisdom of the ancient 
revocability principle in its application to adhesion contracts.  The first is that 
such contracts (like most of those made in the seventeenth century) are not the 
subject of agreement in the moral sense on which the law of contracts rests.  
Karl Llewellyn, the architect of the Uniform Commercial Code, explained: 
Instead of thinking about “assent” to boiler-plate clauses, we can recognize that so far 
as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all.  What has in fact been assented to, 
specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the more broad type of the transaction, 
but one thing more.  The one thing more is a blank assent (not a specific assent) to any 
not unreasonable or indecent term the seller may have on his form[] [that does] not 
alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms.  The fine print that 
has not been read has no business to cut under the reasonable meaning of those dick-
ered terms that constitute the dominant and only real expression of agreement, but 
much of it commonly belongs in.” 63 
When there is no genuine assent, it is not reasonable to assume that the 
benefits gained will trickle down to benefit weaker parties or the public.  Those 
who have read The Wealth of Nations and think otherwise would do well to 
consider Smith’s other great work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments,64 in which 
he calls attention to the unlikelihood that we (or corporate management) will in 
our (or their) own lives and decisions be motivated by a concern for the welfare 
of remote others whom we do not know or expect ever to meet.65  It is fanciful 
to suppose that businesses draft their printed forms to confer benefits on the 
other parties to their contracts, or to benefit the public good generally. 
The second problem to which we advert is redolent of the considerations 
underlying the revocability principle in the seventeenth century.  It is that the 
integrity of the arbitration process is at issue when a weak and beleaguered citi-
zen is brought before an arbitral tribunal created pursuant to a contractual text 
dictated by her adversary.  No doubt many arbitrators can put out of their 
minds the fact that their jurisdiction was created by one party and not the other, 
but some cannot, and even those who do will be mistrusted by those weaker and 
unwilling parties who are not favored with an award and who will attribute their 
defeat to the corruption of the arbitrator.  If both parties are voluntarily before 
the forum, neither they nor the rest of us have standing to protest either the 
lack of accountability or the conferring of arbitral jurisdiction by the will of one 
party alone. 
 
 63. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960).  On the 
relation between this idea and the Uniform Commercial Code, see Richard Danzig, A Comment on the 
Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975). 
 64. ADAM SMITH, THE  THEORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfic eds., 
Liberty Classics 1982) (1759).  
 65. Id. passim. 
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To some extent, state courts have responded to the developments brought 
on by the Court’s treatment of the FAA.  The Court has enabled them to do so 
by acknowledging the applicability of state contract law to determinations of 
whether an arbitration agreement has in fact been reached.66  This has allowed 
numerous state courts to hold specific arbitration clauses unconscionable.67  
Some federal courts have done the same, applying the state law of unconscion-
ability in diversity cases.68 
That is all well enough, but it does not answer either of the concerns sup-
porting the revocability doctrine—that there is no realistic mutual assent to a 
dispute resolution clause in a standard form and that such clauses place at issue 
the disinterest of the arbitral panel because jurisdiction is, as all know, con-
ferred by one party and not the other. 
It was these considerations that moved the automobile dealers in 2001 to 
seek exemption from the Federal Arbitration Act.  As proposed and first 
approved by both houses of Congress, a bill drafted by Senator Hatch of Utah 
would have amended the FAA to exempt automobile dealers.69  In the course of 
reconciling the views of the two houses of Congress, a change was made, per-
haps in response to the sensitivities of the American Arbitration Association, a 
nonprofit organization immune to any concern that arbitration clauses might 
have adverse consequences.  As enacted, Senator Hatch’s bill amended the 1958 
Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act70 to insert into its provisions bearing on 
the franchise agreements dictated by automobile manufacturers the ancient 
principle of revocability.71  At the behest of the National Automobile Dealers 
Association, Congress gave no consideration to the possible application of the 
same principle to clauses in purchase agreements written by the dealers them-
 
 66. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (“When deciding whether the 
parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including arbitrability), courts generally . . . should apply 
ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts.”).  
 67. E.g., Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002); Harold Allen’s Mobile Home 
Factory Outlet, Inc. v. Butler, 825 So. 2d 779 (Ala. 2002); Cash in a Flash Advance of Ark., L.L.C. v. 
Spencer, 74 S.W.3d 600 (Ark. 2002); Flyer Printing Co. v. Hill. 805 So. 2d 829 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); 
Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.2d 1 (Mont. 2002); Milon v. Duke Univ., 559 S.E.2d 789 (N.C. 
2002); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 205 (W. Va. 2002); cf. Armendariz v. Found. Health 
Psychcare Serv., Inc., 6 P.3d 669  (Cal. 2000). 
 68. E.g., McCaskill v. SCI Mgmt. Corp., 294 F.3d 897 (7th Cir. 2002); Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. 
Ticknor, 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1133 (2002); Shankle v. B-G Maint. Colo. 
Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999); Cole 
v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Acorn v. Household Int’l Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 
1160 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding unconscionable an arbitration rider to a mortgage agreement); In re 
Managed Care, 132 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1001 (S.D. Fla. 2000). 
 69. The Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2001, S. 1140, 107th Cong. § 
2 (2001). 
 70. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (2000). 
 71. Act of November 2, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, § 11,028 (to be codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1226) (providing that arbitration agreements between auto manufacturers, importers, and dis-
tributors and auto retailers shall only be enforceable if formed post-dispute).  
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selves to consummate transactions with those who acquire new or used auto-
mobiles.72  The inappropriateness of this disparate treatment is obvious. 
Now come the Poultry Growers of America.  They are small farmers who 
sell their product to very large enterprises on standard printed forms written by 
their buyers and containing arbitration clauses of doubtful conscionability.  
They have enlisted the services of Senator Grassley of Iowa to advocate their 
claim to treatment equal to that of the automobile dealers.73 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
The poultry growers are, we believe, entitled to what they seek.  But then so 
are those who buy automobiles, work for a living, need to check into a hospital, 
need telephone service, or need whatever good or service is accompanied by a 
printed form.  Resurrection of the revocability principle would not mean the 
end of arbitration in any of the circumstances in which private dispute resolu-
tion is now usefully employed.  It would mean only the end of the many kinds of 
clauses now deemed unconscionable and of many other kinds that are deemed 
barely conscionable.  It would assure that arbitration is genuinely beneficial to 
all parties, and that arbitrators have the trust and confidence of all the parties 
who appear before them.  Those objectives are presently worthy of the atten-
tion of Congress. 
 
 
 72. The senior author was retained by the National Automobile Dealers Association to write an 
argument for Senator Hatch’s bill.  He was directed not to make any argument that could also be used 
by consumers.  He agreed to do so, but on condition that he be free to make arguments for consumers 
as well, as he now does. 
 73. See The Fair Contracts for Growers Act of 2003, S. 91, 108th Cong. (2003). 
